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REGULATING EXCESSIVE SPECULATION: THE GLOBAL FOOD CRISIS AND 
‘[T]URNING THE PAGE ON AN ERA OF IRRESPONSIBILITY’? 
 
Anna Chadwick* 
 
 
 
Evidence suggests that commodity derivatives speculation contributed to 
extraordinary patterns of grain price volatility that led to a global food crisis in 
2007-11. People in countries throughout the world are increasingly dependent on 
international commodity markets for access to food. Almost everywhere, now, 
the value of food is determined by a single condensed symbol of its worth—its 
price. Persuaded of the need to ensure that this measure of value is not put at risk 
of distortion in the pursuit of financial profit, governments in the US and in the 
EU are now implementing new regulations designed to curb ‘excessive’ levels of 
speculation in derivative markets. Carrying out an analysis of these regulatory 
measures, the article demonstrates that both sets of reforms suffer from a critical 
limitation: They are predicated on an inaccurate understanding of how activity in 
commodity derivative markets can impact on underlying food prices. If the new 
regulations for commodity derivative markets are not up to the task, as this article 
argues that they are not, a more fundamental revision of global economic 
structures may be required if the basic needs of human beings are not to be 
subsumed to the interests of financial capital in the years to come.     
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The proliferation of derivative instruments that have enabled financial institutions to 
disguise, re-package, and retail debt is now well recognized to have been a contributing 
factor in the causation of the global financial crisis. Less widely acknowledged, though no 
less important, is the role that derivatives played in the causation of the coincident global 
food crisis. Between 2007 and 2008 the prices of staple grains including maize, rice, and 
wheat underwent record levels of inflation, doubling, in some cases, in a matter of months.1 
So extreme was the price inflation that the price of rice on international markets increased by 
31 per cent in a single day, in March 2008.2 The human cost of these market movements was 
very high. The UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) estimates that an additional 
100 million people were pushed into hunger and poverty as a result of grain price volatility 
in 2008 alone.3 Persuaded by evidence that speculative investment contributed to the price 
volatility, G20 governments have moved to introduce new regulations to curb levels of 
financial speculation in commodity derivative markets. The provisions form part of 
legislation enacted in the wake of the global financial crisis that aims to tackle systemic risk 
and to promote economic recovery. The likely efficacy of the US Dodd Frank Act, and the 
European equivalents—the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) and second 
Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID II)—in meeting these financial goals has 
been subject to considerable scrutiny by legal academics. The equally salient question of 
whether the regulations will shield commodity prices from speculative interference, on the 
other hand, has been largely neglected to date. In light of the critical import of ensuring that 
international commodity prices are not distorted by the activities of financial investors, it is 
necessary to give this dimension of the regulatory reforms the attention that it deserves. 
 
The new regulations for commodity derivative markets are not the only initiatives being 
advanced in the aftermath of the global food crisis. A UN High-Level Task Force on the 
Global Food Security Crisis (HLTF) was established in April 2008.4 In its Comprehensive 
Framework for Action, the HLTF makes a number of recommendations with a view to 
tackling food insecurity and ensuring that the events of 2007-11 are not repeated.5 The 
majority of these interventions seek to respond to the needs of populations in low-income 
countries of the Global South, where the price volatility in 2007-11 had the greatest impact. 
However, some recommendations are aimed at ensuring the better performance of 
international commodity markets. One initiative that is seen to be especially promising in this 
regard is the new Agricultural Market Information System (AMIS)—an inter-agency 
platform launched by the G20 Ministers of Agriculture in 2011 that seeks to enhance food 
market transparency.6 The principal idea is to improve the quality and timeliness of market 
data for key food crops by collecting and disseminating data on fundamentals for grains such 
as maize, rice, wheat, and soy.7 Improving the availability of reliable data for crops could 
help to ensure that international commodity prices are better tethered to the fundamentals of 
                                                      
1
 D. Mitchell, ‘A Note on Rising Food Prices’ (2008) World Bank Working Paper WPS 4682, 3. 
2
 J. Blas and D. Ten Kate, ‘Jump in rice price fuels fears of unrest’ Financial Times, 28 March 2008.   
3
 FAO, ‘1.02 billion people hungry’ 19 June 2009, <http://www.fao.org/news/story/en/item/20568/icode/>.   
4
 HLTF on the Global Food Security Crisis, ‘Updated Comprehensive Framework for Action’ (2010) 
<http://www.un-foodsecurity.org/node/842> xi. 
5
 These include the improvement of emergency food provision mechanisms for vulnerable groups, increased 
support for smallholder farming, the strengthening of social safety nets, and the scaling up investment in food 
and nutrition security. Ibid, xiii. 
6
 ‘About AMIS’ <http://www.amis-outlook.org/amis-about/en/>.   
7
 Ibid. 
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supply and demand for agricultural commodities. Indeed, as the analysis below will relate in 
more detail, the development of financialized commodity derivatives that encourage an array 
of market actors to take positions in commodity futures markets that are not based on 
research into agricultural fundamentals is deeply implicated in the price volatility of 2007-11. 
Nonetheless, the AMIS initiative does not directly address the threat posed to food prices by 
practices of derivatives speculation. Moreover, curbing speculative excesses in financial 
markets is widely considered to be a worthwhile regulatory objective in its own right. The 
common narrative that speculators have socialized risk while privatizing profit has been 
taken up by leading political figures, including former Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula 
da Silva, who has openly chastised ‘the irresponsibility of speculators who have transformed 
the world into a gigantic casino’.8  
   
 
The critical importance of the new regulations for commodity derivative markets 
becomes clear when the broader post-crisis agenda for international commodity markets is 
considered. Commodity futures markets are being positioned by international institutions to 
play a leading role in the management of risks extending from international markets going 
forward. This is clear from a 2011 interagency report co-authored by the FAO, the 
International Fund for Agricultural Development, and the UN Conference for Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD), among others (hereafter 2011 Interagency Report).9 Other 
measures that have traditionally been used to guard against market volatility, such as buffer 
stocks, have been rejected in favour of futures markets as the primary means by which 
farmers, manufacturers and other commercial actors can insure themselves against price 
instability.10 This is in spite of the concerns raised as to how financialized futures—
commodity derivatives—may, in fact, present a threat to agricultural production.11 The safe 
and efficient functioning of international markets in the post-crisis era, therefore, depends on 
the successful implementation of the new regulations proposed to curb the excesses of these 
markets. What is more, from a food security perspective, the centrality of the new 
derivatives regulations to the post-crisis market vision is underscored by the fact that trade 
liberalization continues to be high on the international agenda, as is evidenced by the 2011 
Interagency Report. Developing countries are encouraged to reduce import barriers, trade 
distorting domestic support, and remove all forms of export subsidies in order to promote 
growth and facilitate trade.12 These recommendations are a stark contrast to other proposals 
that stress the need to de-link vulnerable populations from volatile global markets. Critics of 
development policy,13 food regime theorists,14 advocates of ‘food sovereignty’,15 and critical 
                                                      
8
  H. Henderson, ‘G-20: Reform The Global Casino’ Inter Presse Service, 21 September 2009, 
<http://www.ipsnews.net/2009/09/g-20-reform-the-global-casino/>. 
9
 FAO, IFAD, WFP UNCTAD et al, ‘Price Volatility in Food and Agricultural Markets: Policy Responses’ (2011) 
Interagency Policy Report, 21-23. 
10
 Buffer stocks—physical grain reserves that are used to influence prices by release into the market—were 
historically a widely used mechanism to combat price volatility. However, the various international commodity 
agreements which provided for stockholding or supply controls to stabilize prices have either collapsed or 
been replaced by agreements whose main role is market information provision. Ibid. 
11
 Ibid. 
12
 Ibid 23. The HLTF also advocates that international trade continue to be focused on ‘the maximization of 
comparative cost advantages, and not be influenced by subsidies and distortions’. HLTF (n 4) 3. 
13
 G. Rist, The history of development: from western origins to global faith (Zed Books, 2002); A Gunder-Frank, 
The development of underdevelopment (New England Free Press, 1966). 
14
 This analysis has been carried out by proponents of ‘food regime theory’—a body of scholarship carrying out 
historical materialist analysis of the development of the global food system. See H. Friedmann, ‘Distance and 
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scholars of international economic law16 have argued for some years that the liberalization of 
trade and of agriculture—coupled with the promotion of an industrialized, specialized, 
export-oriented model of agricultural production geared to exploiting comparative 
advantages—has actively contributed to food insecurity in many countries in the Global 
South, in particular, by conditioning dependence on international commodity markets for 
physical and economic access to food. Many of the countries worst affected by the global 
food crisis were those that were highly dependent on imports for their food supplies. 
Mozambique, for instance, imports 60 per cent of the wheat its people needs, and Egypt 
imports 50 per cent of its food supplies.17 Given that the international community continues 
to favour the liberalization of markets for trade, financial regulations preventing speculative 
trading from exacerbating price volatility on international markets are of fundamental 
importance for the future food security of populations around the world. Evaluating the 
likely efficacy of the US and EU regulations for commodity derivative markets in insulating 
international commodity prices from speculative interference is the main task of this article.  
 
 
The first part of the article will offer an introduction to the phenomenon of 
commodity futures trading and will relate the controversial debate over the role that 
commodity derivatives speculation could have played in the causation of the global food 
crisis. Part Two will carry out an analysis of those regulatory provisions in the new US and 
European frameworks that aim to tackle excessive levels of speculation—provisions that 
NGOs hope will protect commodity prices from future distortion. Part Three moves on to 
advance a critical analysis of the likely efficacy of the regulations in meeting the goals of 
campaigners. Pointing to evidence from the contemporary trading of commodity derivatives, 
this section of the article argues that the new regulations suffer from a critical limitation. 
Both the US and EU reforms have been developed from an inaccurate understanding of the 
way that commodity derivative markets can contribute to price volatility in underlying 
markets. The conclusion drawn from a revised conception of this causal relationship is that 
the reforms are unlikely to offer much protection for commodity prices in the future. The 
article does not offer a concrete alternative proposal for how these issues should be 
addressed, though it does point to a number of measures that might be an improvement on 
the existing proposals. Instead, it calls for NGOs, governments, and regulators to move away 
from a fixation on implementing the existing reforms and asks them to engage in further 
interrogation of the complex operations of modern financial markets and their role in the 
broader economy. Ultimately, it is suggested that a more radical restructuring of global 
economic arrangements may be required if the operations of global financial markets are not 
to jeopardize the most basic needs of human beings in the years to come.  
                                                                                                                                                                        
durability: Shaky foundations of the world food economy’ (1992) 13 TWQ 2; P. McMichael, ‘A food regime 
genealogy’ (2009) 36 J. PEASANT STUD 1. 
15
 R. Patel, ‘Food sovereignty’ (2009) 36 J. PEASANT STUD 3; A. Shattuck and E.Holt-Giménez, ‘Moving from 
Food Crisis to Food Sovereignty’ (2010) 13 YHRDLJ 2. 
16
 Carmen Gonzales illuminates the role of the international trade regime in creating and exacerbating 
vulnerability and food insecurity in the South. C. Gonzalez, ‘Trade liberalization, food security and the 
environment: the neoliberal threat to sustainable rural development’ (2004) 14 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. 
PROBS 420. Anne Orford has also explored the role of free trade doctrines in exacerbating food insecurity in 
already poor parts of the world. See A. Orford, ‘Food security, free trade, and the battle for the state’ (2015) 
11 JILIR 1. 
17
 O. De Schutter, ‘Observations on the current food price situation’ (2011) Background note of the Special 
Rapporteur on the right to food 
<http://www.srfood.org/images/stories/pdf/otherdocuments/20110124_background-note-food-price-
situation_en.pdf> 1. 
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I. COMMODITY DERIVATIVES TRADING AND THE GLOBAL FOOD CRISIS 
 
 
 
The global food crisis 2007-11 saw the prices of many commodities on international 
markets reach historic highs. Particularly impacted were staple grains. According to FAO 
estimates, by the end of 2008, the average world price for rice had risen by 217 per cent, 
wheat by 136 per cent, corn by 125 per cent and soybeans by 107 per cent.18 While the price 
volatility did have a global impact, the effects were particularly acute for poor communities 
in low-income countries in the Global South.19 The rising price of food was instrumental in 
triggering an unprecedented number of food riots between 2007 and the end of 2008 in more 
than 25 countries in Africa, Asia, the Middle East, the Americas and the Caribbean.20 Food 
prices plummeted again in 2009; however, the rapid price deflation caused another kind of 
havoc for the millions of small farmers and laborers worldwide who depend on agricultural 
revenue for their livelihoods.21 This pattern of extreme price inflation and equally precipitous 
deflation was played out again on international markets less than a year later.22  
 
In the years following the first price spike, economists attempting to explain the 
volatility identified a number of causally significant factors. On the supply side, it was 
suggested that a combination of adverse weather conditions,23 low stock levels,24 and the ill-
timed imposition of export-bans meant that markets were tight in the months leading up to 
the food crisis.25 Others argued that the increased production of biofuels,26 a growing appetite 
for meat in emerging economies,27 and the depreciation of US dollar resulted in an increase 
in demand for the grains in question.28 Significantly, however, while almost all of these 
factors are likely to have made some contribution to the price spikes, none of them—either 
alone or combined—can account for the full extent of the volatility. In April 2008, corn 
                                                      
18
 FAO, The State of Food Insecurity in the World 2008: High Food Prices and Food Insecurity – Threats and 
Opportunities (Rome, FAO, 2008).  
19
 M. Ivanic and W. Martin, ‘Implications of higher global food prices for poverty in low-income countries’ 
(2008) World Bank Policy Research Working Paper WPS 4594.  
20
 R. Bush, ‘Food riots: Poverty, Power and Protest’ (2010) 10 J AGRAR CHANGE 21. 
21
 J. Von Braun, Food and Financial Crises: Implications for Agriculture and the Poor (Washington DC, 
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), (2008), 7. 
22
 Grain prices moved in a very similar trajectory between the second half of 2010 and late 2011 with the 
prices of wheat, corn and soybeans all reaching record heights by the summer of 2010. See FAO, ‘World food 
prices reach new historic peak,’ 3 February 2011 <http://www.fao.org/news/story/en/item/50519/icode/>.  
23
 Droughts in Australia and floods in India and Pakistan are commonly cited. See T. Hebling and S. Roache, 
Rising Prices on the Menu: Higher food prices may be here to stay (Washington DC, International Monetary 
Fund, 2011) 24. 
24
 FAO, The State of Agricultural Commodity Markets: What happened to world food prices and why? (Rome, 
FAO, 2009), 17.  
25
 J. Blas, ‘Tackle export bans to ease food crisis,’ Financial Times, 3 February 2011. 
26
 Almost one third of the entire 2008 corn crop in the US was used to produce ethanol to fuel cars. See A. 
Mittall, ‘The 2008 Food Price Crisis: Rethinking Food Security Policies,’ (2009) UNCTAD, G24 Discussion Paper 
Series no 56, 6. 
27
 D. Heady and S. Fan, ‘Anatomy of a crisis: the causes and consequences of surging food prices’ (2008) IFPRI 
Discussion Paper 00831. 
28
 G20, ‘Price Volatility in Food and Agricultural Markets: Policy Responses’ (2011) G20 Policy Report 
<http://www.oecd.org/tad/agricultural-trade/48152638.pdf>. 
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volatility was 30 per cent, and soybean volatility 40 per cent beyond what could be accounted 
for by relevant supply and demand fundamentals during this period.29 A coalition of NGOs 
led by Global Justice Now (formerly World Development Movement), GRAIN, and SOMO 
has since produced a compelling body of evidence that suggests a significant measure of the 
food price volatility in 2007-11 is attributable to speculative trading in commodity derivative 
markets.30 The particulars of this claim require elaboration. 
 
 
A. From Commodity Futures to Financial Derivatives 
 
Derivatives are so called as they are understood to derive their value from that of an 
underlying asset. Some of these assets are tangible, such as property and commodities; others 
are intangible, like stocks, currencies, and interest rates. While these instruments have a 
reputation for being highly complex, at root, they are essentially variations on a more basic 
instrument known as a futures contract. A futures contract is a standardized contract through 
which two parties agree to exchange an agreed amount of a given commodity at a identified 
date in the future for a price negotiated in the present.31 The use of futures as a means of 
agricultural insurance has been prevalent since the nineteenth century. Originally, these 
contracts were only sold on regulated exchanges, known as ‘futures exchanges’. In recent 
decades, however, a new ‘over-the-counter’ (OTC) market—also known as the ‘swaps’ 
market—has emerged.32 OTC transactions are carried out bilaterally, between private parties, 
and are transacted outside of regulated futures exchanges. OTC derivatives are principally 
traded by banks and hedge funds who have devised an extensive range of more elaborate 
financial instruments linked to commodity prices including commodity ‘swaps,’33 and 
commodity ‘index funds’.34 Those claiming that speculation in commodity derivatives played 
a role in the grain price volatility of 2007-11 commonly argue that as a result of processes of 
financialization—catalyzed by earlier financial ‘deregulation’—the operations of commodity 
futures markets have been distorted away from their proper functioning. NGOs claim that no 
longer are commodity derivatives deriving their values from underlying assets but the very 
opposite: that the values of underlying assets—the prices of physical commodities—are now 
being derived from the prices of commodity derivatives.  
 
                                                      
29
 FAO, ’Volatility in Agricultural Commodities: An Update’ (2008) FAO Food Outlook.  
30
 T. Jones, ‘The Great Hunger Lottery: How banking speculation causes food crises’ (2010) World Development 
Movement Report; M. Worthy, ‘Broken Markets: How financial market regulation can help prevent another 
global food crisis’ (2011) World Development Movement Report; M. O. Herman, R. Kelly, and R. Nash, ‘Not a 
Game: Speculation vs. Food Security’ (2011) Oxfam Issues Briefing; M. Vargas and O. Chantry, ‘Ploughing 
through the meanders in food commodity speculation’ (2011) GRAIN Report; M. Vander Stichele et al, 
‘Financing Food: Financialisation and Financial Actors in Agriculture Commodity Markets’ (2010) SOMO Report; 
J. Ghosh, ‘The global food crisis’ (2008) 212 Third World Resurgence 4. 
31
 For an overview of contemporary futures trading see ‘A Trader’s Guide to Futures’ 
<https://www.cmegroup.com/education/files/a-traders-guide-to-futures.pdf>. 
32
 Swaps were first invented in 1981 to facilitate a deal between IBM and the World Bank. They are a species of 
derivative that enable parties to exchange future cash flows, allowing parties to ‘swap’ their respective 
advantages in different markets for mutual benefit. However, ‘swaps’ is a common name given to all OTC 
derivatives. ‘IBM in Deal on Currency’ New York Times, 18 August 1981. 
33
 A commodity swap is a contract where two sides of the deal agree to exchange cash flows, which are 
dependent on the price of an underlying commodity.  
34
 Index funds are designed to give investors a return based on a mathematical formula aggregated from the 
values assigned to a specified basket of commodities including non-food commodities such as fuels and 
metals.  
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It is beyond doubt that the character of commodity futures markets has changed 
remarkably since the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) pioneered the US trade in agricultural 
futures in 1848.35 At that time, these markets were the almost exclusive province of farmers, 
grain traders, and other commercial actors involved in the production and the manufacture of 
food. Today, the majority of futures trading is carried out from the desks of traders in London 
and New York who manage commodity derivatives as part of a portfolio of financial 
investments.36 As of 2012, financial investors were estimated to outnumber commercial 
participants in futures markets by as many as four to one.37 Banks and hedge funds now 
routinely deal in commodity derivatives, developing new products and retailing them to 
clients like pension funds.38 Millions of trades are now executed by computer programmes 
that use algorithms to exploit ‘infinitesimal price discrepancies that only exist over the most 
infinitesimal time horizons’.39 While it is still possible to purchase a traditional futures 
contract for 5,000 bushels of Soft Red Winter Wheat, many individual contracts are now 
bundled together and traded as part of an investment scheme known as a ‘commodity index 
fund’.40 Commodity index funds are designed to give investors a return based on a 
mathematical formula aggregated from the values assigned to a basket of different 
commodities including non-food commodities such as metals and fuels. The first such index 
was created by Goldman Sachs in 1991. As researchers at Global Justice Now have 
underlined, commodity index funds have since become the primary vehicle for speculative 
capital involvement in food commodity markets. Understood in Epstein’s terms, 
financialization connotes the increasing role of financial motives, financial markets, financial 
actors and financial institutions in the operations of commodity futures markets.41 According 
to analysts at UNCTAD, it is as a consequence of the financialization of futures trading that 
grain prices have become more volatile in recent years.42  
 
The role of market deregulation in enabling the development of a market in OTC 
derivatives has been discussed by a number of NGO analysts, as well as by historians and 
legal scholars.43 As Lynn Stout has illustrated, OTC derivatives that had begun to be traded 
                                                      
35
 A. Bjerga, Endless Appetites: How the Commodities Casino Creates Hunger and Unrest (John Wiley & Sons, 
2011), 6. 
36
 CME Group, ‘Annual Report Pursuant To Section 13 Or 15(D) Of The Securities Exchange Act Of 1934,’ 
<http://investor.cmegroup.com/investor-relations/secfiling.cfm?filingID=1156375-13-7>. 
37
 Michael Greenberger speaking at the High Level Thematic Debate on Addressing Excessive Price Volatility in 
Food and Related Financial and Commercial Markets, United Nations, New York, on Wednesday 11 April 2012, 
<http://www.unmultimedia.org/tv/webcast/2012/04/general-assembly-thematic-debate-on-addressing-
excessive-price-volatility-in-food-and-related-financial-and-commodity-markets.html>. 
38
 The UK Financial Services Authority (FSA) estimated that, as of 2007, approximately 80 billion dollars of 
capital from pension funds globally was invested in commodities. E. Doyle, J. Hill, and I. Jack, ‘Growth in 
Commodity investment: risks and challenges for commodity market participants’ 
<http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/commodity_invest.pdf>, 23. 
39
 M. O’Brien, ‘Everything you need to know about High-Frequency Trading’ The Atlantic, 11 April 2014, 
<http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2014/04/everything-you-need-to-know-about-high-
frequency-trading/360411/>.  
40
  Jones, ‘The Great Hunger Lottery’ (n 30), 9. 
41
 G. A. Epstein, (Ed), Financialization and the world economy (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2005), 3. 
42
 ‘Don’t blame the physical markets: Financialization is the root cause of oil and commodity price volatility’ 
(2012) UNCTAD Policy Brief no. 25. 
43
 The role of financial deregulation in precipitating the financialization of commodity futures markets has 
been discussed by a number of commentators. While these scholars are correct to argue that changes in the 
law were instrumental in bringing about growth of the OTC derivatives market, it is inaccurate to suggest that 
all of the changes amounted to ‘deregulation’. Derivatives can be understood as a form of regulation in 
themselves, and the OTC market depends on an intricate network of contracts, legal techniques, and courts in 
 8
outside of regulated futures exchanges in the 1980s were at risk of being voided as ‘contracts 
for difference’ under Common law rules that saw speculative trading as no better than 
gambling.44 In the UK, these obstacles were overcome with relative ease via the passing of 
the Financial Services Act of 1986.45 In the US, legislation from the 1930s that sought to 
restrict the volume of speculative investment in exchange-traded commodity futures stood in 
the way of industry ambitions to grow the market. A decade-long battle commenced as Wall 
Street sought to distinguish the new OTC derivatives from illegal contracts for difference.46 
In spite of doubt expressed about the safety of the proposals, the Clinton Administration 
eventually passed the Commodity Futures Modernization Act (CFMA) in 2000.47 As well as 
legitimizing the emerging market in OTC derivative instruments, a provision in the CFMA 
known as the ‘swap-dealer’ loophole benefited financial institutions selling OTC derivatives 
by treating them as commercial hedgers for the purposes of investing in exchange-traded 
futures contracts. This re-characterization allowed financial institutions dealing in swaps to 
take long‐term positions in exchange traded futures—a change that paved the way for the 
development of commodity index funds.48 
 
 
B. Competing Claims 
 
 Levels of investment rose astronomically on both futures exchanges and the OTC 
market following the CFMA. The size of the OTC market had ballooned to close to nine 
trillion dollars by the end of 2007.49 The volume of investment in financial instruments linked 
to commodity prices also surged dramatically during this period. At Lehman Brothers 
investment bank, the capital being funneled into index investment increased by 1,900% 
between 2003 and March 2008.50 NGOs place great emphasis on the scale and timing of this 
surge in trade, arguing that it served to produce a ‘speculative bubble’ in commodity prices. 
As Global Justice Now reports, ‘Gregory Fleming, President of Merril Lynch, said in May 
2008 that commodity markets looked similar to the dot.com bubble of the late 1990s and the 
bubble in structured-credit products which preceded the credit crunch.’51 NGOs have also 
presented persuasive statistical evidence of a causal link between the price volatility and 
practices of commodity derivatives speculation.52 In particular, it is emphasized that new 
correlations between the prices of previously distinct groups of commodities have been 
                                                                                                                                                                        
order to function. A more compelling analysis is that financial regulations were not so much removed but 
rather recalibrated during the 1990s and 2000s. For an account of the legal changes made to allow for the 
emergence of the OTC market see L. A. Stout, ‘Derivatives and the Legal Origin of the 2008 Credit Crisis’ (2011) 
1 HBLR 1 and G. Tett, Fool's Gold: How Unrestrained Greed Corrupted a Dream, Shattered Global Markets and 
Unleashed a Catastrophe (Abacus, 2010), 26-47. For scholarship that problematizes the discourse on 
‘deregulation’ see S. Vogel, Freer Markets, More Rules: Regulatory Reform in Advanced Industrial Countries 
(Cornell University Press, 1996). 
44
 Stout, ibid, 11-15.  
45
 Under Section 63, the FSA 1986 offered OTC trading an enforceability guarantee in the UK. 
46
 Tett and Stout (n 43) 
47
 Commodity Futures Modernization Act 2000. 
48
 J. Ghosh, ‘The Commodity Price Rollercoaster’ (2008) World Development Movement Report, 5. 
49
 J. Ghosh, ‘The unnatural coupling: Food and global finance’ (2010) 10 J AGRAR CHANGE 1.  
50
 P. Wahl, ‘Food Speculation as the Main Factor of the Price Bubble in 2008’ (2009) World Economy, Ecology & 
Development Briefing Paper, 11.  
51
 Ibid. 
52
 Ghosh ‘The unnatural coupling’ (n 49). 
 9
observed since index fund trading has become prevalent.53  NGOs have condemned the 
activities of financial traders, and have called on policy-makers and regulators to take action. 
As Global Justice Now asserted in 2010, ‘allowing gambling on hunger in financial markets 
is dangerous, immoral and indefensible. And it needs to be stopped before any more people 
suffer to satisfy the greed of the banks.’54  
 
In contrast to the arguments of the NGOs, the very possibility that speculative trading 
in derivative markets could have this kind of impact on underlying commodity prices is 
vehemently denied by many financial institutions, as well as some prominent economists.55 
Paul Krugman has insisted that ‘a futures contract is a bet about the future price. It has no, 
zero, nada direct effect on the spot price of a physical food commodity.56 The claim that 
financial traders taking positions in derivatives markets could cause the prices of tangible 
food commodities to display such volatility contravenes many of mainstays of economic 
theory. Prices in a market economy are considered to bear a rational relationship to their 
‘true’ values as determined by fundamentals of supply and demand. This is thought to be 
particularly true of asset prices in financial markets, which—via the assimilation and 
dissemination of information on fundamentals across dispersed markets—are commonly 
believed to contribute to processes of ‘price discovery’.57 Even if a group of speculators were 
driving futures prices away from fundamentals, it is commonly held that ‘the market’—or, 
more accurately, a contingent of market participants known as ‘arbitrageurs’—would correct 
this.58 Many economists also resist what they regard as an inaccurate and misleading 
portrayal of speculative investment by the NGOs. As Kulkarni maintains, ‘[b]y assuming 
risk, providing liquidity and capital the speculator brings stability to the market’.59  
 
Parties on both sides of this contentious debate have turned to causal economic 
analysis in the effort to prove conclusively whether or not speculative practices were a cause 
of the commodity price volatility.60 A number of studies rely on Granger causality testing, 
but reach opposing conclusions.61 In response to this impasse, it has been suggested that 
existing causal models are simply unable to explain the complex inter-linkages between 
                                                      
53
 Economists at UNCTAD have highlighted that the prices of many commodities including metals, agriculture 
and energy commodities are ‘clearly moving today in tandem’, when, prior to the development of derivative 
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contemporary global financial and commodity markets.62 Indeed, the question of whether 
financial activity in derivative markets (speculative or otherwise) can impact on underlying 
commodity prices has been designated by analysts at the New England Complex Systems 
Institute (NECSI) as ‘one of the central controversies of economics’.63 Under pressure to 
respond to what civil society actors insist is a grave threat to food prices, governments in the 
US and in Europe have adopted a precautionary approach and have moved to introduce 
regulations to reduce ‘excessive’ levels of speculation in commodity derivative markets.64 
Regulatory agencies in these jurisdictions have now finalized rules which aim to subject the 
OTC derivative market to a higher degree of regulatory supervision and oversight. These 
measures will now be discussed. 
 
 
 
II. REGULATORY REFORMS: DODD FRANK AND EMIR-MIFID II 
 
 
In September 2009 world leaders met at the G20 forum in Pittsburgh and sought to ‘turn 
the page on an era of irresponsibility’, agreeing to develop regulations to stabilize the 
financial system in order to meet the needs of the twenty-first century global economy.65 
Preventing another global food crisis was not an explicit aim of the reforms; nevertheless, 
concerns about commodity derivatives speculation were exertive. Among the many 
commitments made at the G20 Summit was a specific pledge to improve the regulation of 
financial and commodity markets in order to address excessive commodity price volatility.66 
G20 leaders undertook to ensure that ‘where appropriate’ all standardized OTC derivative 
contracts should be traded on exchanges or electronic trading platforms and cleared through 
central counterparties by end-2012 at the latest.67 While all of the G20 member states 
committed to enact this reform, the US and countries of the EU have been at the forefront of 
the efforts.  
 
In the US, most of the provisions giving effect to the G20 commitment on OTC 
derivatives fall under Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd Frank).68 In Europe the G20 commitment will be met by two 
separate instruments: the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR)69 and the 
Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID II).70 In both cases, national and regional 
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regulatory agencies have been tasked with elaborating technical standards to give substantive 
effect to the objectives outlined in the framework agreements.71 The reforms aim to ensure 
that the trade in OTC derivatives is more effectively monitored, better collateralized and 
poses less of a threat to the stability of the global financial system. It is this goal that has to be 
understood as the primary target of the new regulations. Only one provision is explicitly 
aimed at addressing speculatively-conditioned commodity price volatility, which is the 
imposition of position limits (see below). Nevertheless, a number of the other regulations are 
seen by NGOs to offer some ancillary potential in terms of limiting excessive speculation. 
These include restrictions on proprietary trading, the requirement that derivatives go through 
centralized clearing, the obligation to report trading data, and the regulation of automated and 
high frequency trading (HFT) technologies. A short overview of each of these regulatory 
measures is offered below. 
 
 
A. Overview of Regulatory Provisions 
 
 
1. Position limits 
 
In response to concerns about the volume of financial investment in commodity 
futures markets, regulators have mandated the imposition of limits on the amount of contracts 
that parties can purchase in both the exchange-traded and OTC trading arenas. Position limits 
are the principal measure in the new regulatory frameworks explicitly designed to ‘diminish, 
eliminate, or prevent excessive speculation’.72  The rules are designed to place an upper limit 
on the number of positions other than bona fide hedging positions which an investor or 
combined group of investors may hold for a specific commodity. The hedging exemption 
(discussed below) seeks to preserve the benefits of non-standardized bilateral OTC 
transactions for commercial hedgers—a strategy thought to be important given the critical 
role of futures and derivatives as risk management devices. CFTC commissioners voted in 
October 2012 to issue position limits on 28 commodity derivative contracts, including 
nineteen agricultural commodities, metals and fuels.73 The limits apply for exchange-traded 
futures contracts and their ‘economically equivalent’ futures, options and swaps—the OTC 
contracts.74 The CFTC has set the limits at 25 per cent of estimated deliverable supply in 
‘spot month contracts’—the spot month being the final month of the contract when futures 
prices are supposed to converge meet the prices of physical commodities.75 The Draft 
Regulatory Technical Standards (RTS) developed by ESMA are largely identical to the US 
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provisions, setting a limit of 25 per cent of deliverable supply in spot-month contracts.76 
However, there is one important difference in that Draft RTS 29, article 1(5) allows national 
authorities within the EU to use their discretion to set higher limits than those recommended 
by ESMA.77 National authorities may vary the baseline by either increasing or decreasing it 
by up to an additional 15%.78 NGOs have reacted against ESMA’s decision to allow national 
authorities the remit to adjust position limits. Finance Watch has protested that this is 
contrary to the spirit of the MiFID II agreement, and, if approved, will turn limits on 
speculation decided by the European Parliament into ‘an empty shell’.79 
 
 
2. Proprietary trading 
 
Proprietary trading occurs when financial entities use their own funds to trade in 
addition to that of customers in order to make a profit. Such practices are deemed to largely 
speculative in nature by industry experts such as Paul Volcker, the former chairman of the 
US Federal Reserve, and the proponent of the US regulation. The restrictions on proprietary 
trading seek to re-effectuate the separation between retail and investment banking that was 
mandated by the Glass-Steagall Act before it was repealed in 1999.80 Under the Volcker 
Rule, enacted under Title VI of Dodd-Frank, banks are prohibited from using or investing 
more than three per cent of their capital for this variety of trading.81 On the European side, 
draft plans by the EU financial services Chief Michel Barnier propose to restrict systemically 
important banks from proprietary trading from 2018 onwards.82 The EU proposes to deal 
with the risks emanating from proprietary trading through the use of supplementary 
provisions that ‘ring-fence’ such trading, requiring banks to transfer other high-risk trading 
activities including complex derivatives and securitization operations to separate legal trading 
entities within the group.83  
 
 
3. Central counterparty clearing 
 
The consensus reached in the aftermath of the global financial crisis was that it was 
the bilateral character of OTC trades that was particularly problematic. Accordingly, the 
centrepiece of the OTC reforms is a requirement that trades go through a process known as 
‘centralized clearing’. Under this process, instead of trading bilaterally with one another the 
counterparty of each trader will ultimately be an institution known as a clearing house—
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labelled ‘CCPs’ under EMIR and ‘DCOs’ under Dodd-Frank.84 The clearing obligation 
transposes into the OTC arena the kinds of institutional safeguards that have traditionally 
characterized the trading of futures contracts on futures exchanges. Significantly, clearing 
houses requiring the posting of additional collateral than OTC trades.85 Clearing houses are to 
be directly regulated by the CFTC and SEC in the US, and by ESMA in Europe. Categories 
of derivatives that are subject to the mandatory clearing requirements must also be transacted 
on a regulated trading arena: a futures exchange, a swap-execution facility, a registered 
electronic trading platform, or an organized trading facility.  
 
4. Reporting requirements 
 
A dominant theme in debates over the market in OTC derivatives is that they are 
opaque, and that this lack of transparency has impaired regulators in their efforts to monitor 
these markets. Key provisions under Title VII of Dodd-Frank and Article 9 of EMIR require 
both trading entities and centralized clearing organisations to report details of all derivatives 
contracts to the CFTC and SEC in the US, and to designated ‘trade repositories’ in the EU. 
Both sets of reporting requirements are broadly similar, however, EMIR is considered to be 
slightly more demanding as it requires reports from both parties to a transaction,86 and 
requires the collection of more detailed trading data than that required under Dodd Frank.87 
The overall purpose of these provisions is to give regulators more information about volumes 
of transaction within the market in order that risks may be identified at an earlier stage. 
Regulators are also imbued with potentially far reaching powers to intervene in markets on 
the basis of information communicated to them via transaction data.88  
 
5. Automated and HFT trading technologies 
 
On the 24th of November 2015, the CFTC issued a notice of proposed rulemaking on 
the regulation of both automated and high frequency trading (HFT) in US markets.89 Under 
the proposed rule, persons engaged in automated trading would be responsible for 
implementing a number of pre- and post- trade controls, including monitoring execution 
frequency per unit time and order price and maximum order size parameters, as well as 
implementing order cancellation systems, developing standards for new technologies, and 
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testing and monitoring them.90 In the EU, a harmonized framework of regulations for HFT 
has recently been agreed by the European Parliament under MiFID II. The measures include 
regulations designating a standardized ‘tick’ size—the size of the individual trade—in a bid 
to prevent trading venues from attracting aggressive trading based on miniscule differences in 
price.91 Other provisions include a requirement for trading venues to synchronize their clocks 
to make it easier to spot abuses, an obligation to test algorithms and trading software on 
regulated exchanges, and the use of ‘circuit breakers’ to stop the trading process if price 
volatility gets too high.92 The efficacy of the provisions will depend on their final shape and 
implementation.  
 
6. Exemptions 
 
Both the US and European regulations impose a different regulatory burden for different 
types of market participant. The full spectrum of the regulations in Title VII is reserved for 
‘Swaps Dealers’—large financial entities who create financial products—on the basis that 
these institutions pose a greater threat in terms of systemic risk. The European reforms affect 
a similar distinction between two categories of actors: ‘financials’—banks, insurers and asset 
managers—and ‘non-financials’.93 Exemptions have been built into both sets of regulations 
to retain the benefits of bilaterally negotiated OTC trading for commercial hedgers (‘End 
Users under Dodd Frank), exempting them from position limits.94 Both Dodd Frank and 
EMIR grant further exemptions to ‘small financials’ engaged in a ‘de minimis quantity’ of 
derivatives trading.95  
 
While the de minimis exemption has been carved out with some precision, bona fide 
hedging has been given several differing definitions within the CFTC rulemaking areas.96 
The CFTC has emphasized that the definition of hedging does not include a market position 
that is held for a purpose that is in the nature of ‘speculation, investing, or trading’,97 defined 
as ‘those positions executed primarily to take an outright view on market direction or to 
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obtain an appreciation in value of the swap position itself’.98 A bona fide hedge is defined as 
a position taken to hedge against ‘commercial risk’. Commercial risk has been defined by the 
CFTC as risk that it ‘economically appropriate to the reduction of risks in the conduct and 
management of a commercial enterprise, where the risks arise in the ordinary course of 
business’.99 Examples given are risks arising from a potential change in the value of assets 
that a person ‘owns, produces, manufactures, processes, or merchandises’.100 Article 10 of 
EMIR carves out a largely similar provision to define the meaning of legitimate hedging for 
‘non-financial counterparties’.101 The regulatory wording strongly implies that only those 
parties seeking to hedge commercial risks associated with productive activities can benefit 
from the exemptions, and that parties—commercial or financial—who are trying to speculate 
or to hedge against financial risks taken in other markets are not able to benefit. Nonetheless, 
there remains some ambiguity as to who can claim a hedging exemption and with respect to 
which transactions. 
 
 
B. Summary 
 
 
Both the US and EU reforms to the trading of derivatives aim to tackle what are now 
regarded to be ‘excessive’ levels of speculation in these markets, while preserving their 
benefits for commercial actors seeking to hedge against commercial risks. The principle 
measure designed to curb levels of speculation is the imposition of position limits. 
Campaigners at the Global Justice Now and Oxfam have fought hard to ensure that the limits 
are put in place. In particular, these groups have lobbied European regulators to ensure that 
the provisions under MiIFID II are not be limited to a weaker approach of ‘position 
management’.102 However, critics have pointed out that the limits are set so high as to be of 
dubious value in the efforts to tackle speculation. As analysts at the IATP have pointed out, at 
level of 25 per cent, ‘in theory, four trading entities could control the market in a specific 
contract’.103 Although position limits are the principal measure envisaged to respond to 
concerns about commodity price volatility, restrictions on proprietary trading could also 
serve to curb the volume of capital used by financial institutions to enter into short-term 
speculative trading ventures. Furthermore, there may be additional ancillary benefits from 
those regulatory rules that have principally been crafted to respond to the threat of systemic 
risk in the financial system. Clearing and margin requirements should make it somewhat 
more expensive and laborious for financial institutions that deal in commodity derivatives to 
do so for speculative purposes. Reporting requirements could help to counteract the market 
opacity that disabled regulators in the years leading up to the global financial crisis, and there 
would also appear to be some potential in the regulations to curb high frequency trading. 
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It is difficult to offer a definitive assessment of the efficacy of the regulations until they 
have been finalized, and until market practices have been amended in response to the rules. 
What can be said at the present juncture is that the approach adopted by both the US and 
European regulators has been largely similar, with few major differences between the two 
regimes.104 This is important as harmonization across jurisdictions is seen as imperative to 
the effective regulation of financial markets given their globalized and liberalized character.  
It is expected that the US and EU provisions will act as a blueprint for other G20 
governments in their efforts to develop derivatives regulations.105 In terms of reactions to the 
reforms, NGOs have welcomed the new rules, though it is commonly argued that more 
stringent measures, such as a ban on commodity index funds, ought to have been taken.106 
NGOs are now concentrating their efforts on ensuring that the new regulations are not 
watered down due to pressure from the financial services industry. Both ESMA and the 
CFTC and SEC are engaged in protracted consultation policies that require them to publish 
draft rules and to respond to any comments that are submitted. The CFTC was inundated by 
nearly 15,000 comment letters in response to just one of its rules,107 and critics have noted 
that the rule-making process is being dominated by financial institutions.108 Oxfam has 
expressed concern that regulators are being pressured to adjust the rules to accommodate the 
financial services industry’s desire to continue a profitable trade in financial instruments 
linked to commodity prices.109 Another worrying trend in this vein is that banks and hedge 
funds have begun to engage in forms of organizational and jurisdictional arbitrage—
restructuring their operations, or moving them to other jurisdictions—apparently in an effort 
to mitigate the impact of the rules.110 Financial institutions are already said to be exploring 
the frontiers of collateral ‘management’ and ‘transformation’ to lessen the regulatory load.111 
It remains unclear what the final result of this forum-shopping and product-shaping will be. 
NGOs are highly alert to these developments, and aim to maintain an active presence as the 
regulatory rules are finalized.112 Some attention is also being paid to concerns about 
directions in regulatory evasion, and a number of scholars are writing on the challenges that 
financial innovation is likely to present for the future of these regulatory endeavours.113 In 
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mainstream policy and regulatory circles, however, interest in the matter of speculatively-
conditioned commodity price volatility is waning. Overwhelmingly, analysis of the Dodd-
Frank and EMIR-MiFID II regimes has centred on tackling systemic risk, and on restoring 
stability in financial markets to reassure and attract investors.  
 
The next section will make an argument as to why entrusting these regulations with the 
future food security of millions of people worldwide could be a grave mistake. As the 
forthcoming analysis will make clear, in spite of the considerable efforts of regulators to 
delineate between speculators and hedgers and to come up with a sufficiently sensitive 
scheme of rules for these markets, the new provisions fail to adequately account for how 
commodity derivatives trading can impact on underlying commodity prices.  
 
 
 
 
III. CRITIQUE OF THE REGULATORY MEASURES 
 
 
 
The highly polarized views on the causal significance of commodity derivatives trading 
in the global food crisis have already been discussed. Outside of the financial services 
industry, it is commonly accepted that derivatives speculation made some contribution to the 
price volatility. Nevertheless, there remains substantial ambiguity as to precisely how this 
occurred. The difficulty in forming a conclusive judgment on the role that these instruments 
played in the events of 2007-11 is illustrated by the 2011 Interagency Report, which 
concluded that increased financial sector involvement in food commodity markets ‘probably 
acted to amplify short-term price swings and could have contributed to the formation of price 
bubbles in certain circumstances’.114 The complex dynamics of price formation between 
capital markets and commodity markets have also made ‘proving’ a causal connection in 
accordance with economic standards of causation difficult. A coalition of researchers at 
NECSI has since developed what they describe as a ‘dynamic mathematical model’ that 
‘overcomes the limitations of earlier studies’ and establishes a significant causal role for 
speculation. The NECSI analysts claim that their model proves that the two sharp peaks in 
2007-08 and 2010-11 were ‘specifically due to investor speculation’, while an underlying 
upward trend is ‘due to increasing demand from ethanol conversion’.115 Given the prestige of 
the institution, this would seem a persuasive finding. Nevertheless, the NECSI study, along 
with the other analyses that have been carried out on the causal impact of derivatives trading 
are predominantly concerned to show if commodity derivative trading had an impact. They 
are not so informative as to precisely how the trading of commodity derivatives influenced 
the prices of underlying commodities in 2007-11.  
 
NGOs including Global Justice Now, GRAIN, SOMO, and Oxfam have been the primary 
groups to have studied the question of how activity in commodity derivative markets can 
impact on underlying food prices. This group of interlocutors places great emphasis on a 
surge in levels of speculation on commodity futures markets since they were ‘deregulated’, 
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and also take issue with the development of instruments such as commodity index funds.116 
The reports of Global Justice Now, in particular, shed a lot of light on how trading practices 
have changed with the elaboration of these new pathways to profitable investment in 
commodity markets—a point that will shortly be elaborated. Nevertheless, there is significant 
ambiguity in terms of how they consider derivatives trading to impact on underlying food 
prices. NGOs have tended to cast ‘speculative’ ‘financial’ investment as a negative practice, 
and to view the use of futures for ‘commercial’ ‘hedging’ and risk management purposes in a 
benevolent light. Yet, distinguishing whether an investment practice is or isn’t ‘speculative’ 
is not straightforward.117  Speculative investment is often reputed to involve taking on higher 
levels of risk than the average investor, and is commonly equated with short-term trading. 
However, such a characterization does not equate with the mechanics of index investment—
said to be a key contributor to the price spikes in 2007-8 and 2010-11. Index investment is 
carried out over the long-term, and provides stable, as opposed to risky, returns.118 Making 
matters more complex, many financial institutions use both exchange-traded commodity 
futures and OTC instruments to hedge against risks taken in other financial markets.119 Such 
macro-portfolio hedging strategies make it hard to convincingly determine which market 
actors are speculating or when they are doing it. Not only have large agribusiness companies 
who have predominantly traded physical food commodities—Archer Daniels Midland 
(ADM), Bunge, and Cargill—begun to sell commodity derivatives to farmers and food 
manufacturers, they now engage in ‘proprietary trading’—taking speculative positions in the 
market with their own capital.120 Some of these agricultural conglomerates own hedge funds 
that specialize in commodity derivatives trading. A prominent example is Black River Asset 
Management LLC, a subsidiary of Cargill that was rumoured to have $6 billion in assets in 
October 2011.121 
 
A development in the US illustrates how necessary it is to clarify the nature of the causal 
connection between practices of commodity derivatives speculation and the food price 
volatility of 2007-11. The financial services industry has successfully exploited uncertainty 
over how activity in derivatives markets impacts on underlying food prices to have the 
CFTC’s position limits overturned by the courts.  The CFTC’s limits were due to be imposed 
in October 2012, however, two trade associations associated with the derivatives industry 
successfully petitioned to have the regulations struck down. The text of Dodd Frank only 
mandates the imposition of such limits ‘as appropriate’.122 Significantly, these groups 
contend that this was not the case since, in their view, it ‘remains unclear’ that excessive 
levels of speculation were the cause of the recent price volatility.123 On 28 September 2012, 
at a District Court in Washington DC ruled that the CFTC had failed to heed instructions 
requiring it to determine that its rule was ‘necessary to diminish, eliminate or prevent 
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excessive speculation’.124 The CFTC appealed the judgement, and is in the process of 
drafting new limits on the basis of a finding that they are indeed ‘necessary and appropriate’ 
to this goal. The re-proposed rules are on track to closely mirror the vacated rules.125 
However, there is widespread concern that the victory in Washington will embolden banks to 
challenge other provisions. There is also the possibility that legal challenges will be mounted 
against the European measures.126 
 
 Legislators in the US and in Europe have been persuaded to adopt a precautionary 
approach to the issue of commodity derivatives speculation, and have introduced regulations 
that reflect NGO concerns about food security. As will now be demonstrated, however, this 
has resulted in a regulatory strategy that largely misses the mark in its attempt to address the 
threat posed to food prices by commodity derivatives trading. After seeking to precise the 
vision of commodity derivatives speculation upon which the US and EU initiatives are 
based, the final section of the article will draw on evidence from market practice to offer an 
alternative explanation for how derivatives can impact on underlying commodity prices.  
 
 
A. Current Regulatory Vision 
 
 
In both the US and EU regulatory frameworks the principal measures implemented to 
respond to speculatively-conditioned commodity price volatility—position limits—are 
grounded in a market-power analysis of how derivatives trading has impacted on food prices. 
The limits, which restrict that number of contracts that both individual traders and trading 
institutions can purchase, effectively seek to prevent any one trader or institution from 
having a monopoly in the market. Allowing both financial and commercial actors a limited 
capacity for speculation is based on the widely held view that some degree of speculative 
participation in the market is necessary for the provision of liquidity. Speculative investors 
are seen to assist those parties using commodity futures to hedge against risk by taking up 
the other side of the contracts. As mentioned earlier, commodity futures markets are being 
positioned as the primary tool of risk management for commercial actors who are vulnerable 
to volatility and price shocks from liberalized international markets. Instead of lying in the 
financialization of commodity futures markets, the threat posed to commodity prices by 
commodity derivatives is seen to lie with an ‘excessive’ volume of speculation carried out by 
a contingent of financial speculators, who are understood to have monopolized markets, 
thereby distorting commodity prices away from their fundamental values.  
 
 
The regulation of new trading technologies aside, the Dodd Frank and EMIR-MiFID II 
reforms largely reinstate regulatory measures adopted in the US in the 1930s in response to 
concerns about a burgeoning culture of market speculation and its links to grain price 
volatility. Position limits, classifications that distinguish ‘financial’ ‘speculators’ from 
‘commercial’ ‘hedgers’, and the requirement that all derivatives be traded on regulated 
exchanges are all throw-backs to the English and American Common law restrictions on 
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‘purely’ speculative trading,127 many of which were formalized as part of the Grain Futures 
Act of 1922 in the US, and later re-enacted in 1936 as the Commodity Exchange Act.128 
While these provisions did help to curb the speculative trade in ‘off-exchange’ commodity 
futures during much of the twentieth century, the character of commodity futures trading has 
changed dramatically in the interim. The exchange-based futures trading of earlier eras bears 
little resemblance to contemporary trading practices in terms of trading volumes, market 
participants, investment products and strategies, or the speed and complexity of 
transactions.129 The next section will draw on evidence of shifts in market practice and the 
altered role of financial markets in the global economy to argue that the Dodd Frank and 
EMIR-MIFID II reforms are based on an outdated understanding of the relationship between 
commodity derivatives speculation and patterns of price volatility.  
 
 
B. Changes in the Nature of Speculation 
 
 
As Olivier de Schutter—former Special Rapporteur on the right to food—has underlined, 
the ‘traditional’ form of speculation carried out in the early days of the CBOT was still 
speculation based on agricultural fundamentals.130 Speculators were betting on the future 
direction of commodity prices based on their information about agricultural production, and 
a link to agriculture was maintained. Commodity derivatives trading in contemporary futures 
markets, on the other hand, is predominantly ‘momentum based’. In synergy with trading in 
other financial markets, traders increasingly engage in ‘herding’ behaviour—observing the 
markets and anticipating how other actors are going to invest.131 That herding behaviour and 
market psychology can lead to the formation of ‘speculative bubbles’ has been ably 
demonstrated by scholarship from the Behavioural School of economics, most notably, the 
work of Nobel prize-winning economist, Robert Shiller.132  
 
New commodity derivatives actively structure investments around momentum-based 
trading. Commodity index funds channel large volumes of capital into passive ‘long’ 
positions, premised on the expectation that prices for commodities can only go up.133 Vast 
sums of money are channeled into indexes by large institutional investors, such as pension 
funds, irrespective of the day-to-day movements of each individual commodity. Far from 
being a reflection on the actual movements in supply and demand for grain, the investment is 
effectively ‘on autopilot’.134 As of March 2008, commodity index funds were estimated to 
control an amount of corn, wheat and soybeans equivalent to half of total US stocks for such 
                                                      
127
 Stout Legal Origin (n 43), 11. 
128
 Grain Futures Act of 1922; Commodity Exchange Act 1936. 
129
 Staritz and Küblböck (n 104), 15. 
130
 O. De Schutter, ‘Food Commodities Speculation and Food Price Crises: Regulation to reduce the risks of 
price volatility’ (2010) Briefing note 02, 3. 
131
 UNCTAD, ‘Price formation in financialized commodity markets: The role of information’ (2011) UNCTAD 
Report, 21. 
132
 Robert Shiller won a Nobel Prize for his work on speculative bubbles in the 1990s in which he demonstrated 
how ‘feedback loops’ created by traders adopting positions informed by the behaviour of other traders could 
drive prices away from fundamentals and result in market volatility. R. J. Shiller, Irrational exuberance 
(Princeton University Press, 2015). 
133
 Investing ‘long’ means investing in the expectation that an asset is going to rise in value.  
134
  J. Rogers, Hot Commodities: How Anyone Can Invest Profitably in the World’s Best Market (John Wiley & 
Sons, 2007), 58. 
 21 
grains.135 Index fund investment is further exacerbated by increased reliance on financial 
algorithms. More than 95 per cent of futures are bought and sold today through computer 
networks, many of which operate to exploit a twitch in market movement or value, 
irrespective of what informed it. 136 Economists at UNCTAD studying the impact of such 
high frequency trading technologies estimate that at least 60-70 per cent of commodity price 
changes are now due to self-generated activities, rather than novel information.137 The 
significance of the shift towards momentum-based trading is that many market actors are no 
longer making investments based on research into agricultural fundamentals. They are not 
incentivized to do so. As Hyman Minsky and John Maynard Keynes have both argued, it can 
become irrational for traders to persist in trying to trade on market fundamentals when so-
called ‘technical’ or ‘noise’ traders are driving prices upwards of fundamentals.138  
 
This brief foray into the mechanics of contemporary market practice clearly illustrates 
the limitations of the current regulatory approach based on position limits. Rather than being 
the consequence of the ‘excessive’ volume of speculative trading, or ‘outsize’ monopolistic 
derivatives transactions by single market actors and institutions, price volatility needs to be 
understood as a consequence of the cumulative trading practices of thousands of individual 
traders using new trading techniques: index fund trading, reliance on trading algorithms, and 
a culture of herding behaviour. Significantly, these traders may not be based at the same 
financial institution, or even domiciled in the same jurisdiction. Closer scrutiny of 
contemporary trading practices also casts doubt on the benefits of provisions aimed at 
improving transparency. As financial industry insiders have noted, greater transparency 
effected through data reporting allows opportunistic market participants to learn about their 
competitors’ trading strategies.139 This could mean that the US and EU reporting 
requirements may only serve to exacerbate trends in herding behavior, and encourage further 
momentum-based trading. The AMIS initiative might help to mitigate against this trend in 
that it aims to improve the dissemination of accurate data on agricultural commodities. 
Nevertheless, this does not address the possibility that the proliferation of commodity 
derivatives and the profitable opportunities that they extend to market actors has changed the 
basis on which trading decisions are made in commodity derivatives markets. Simply 
ensuring the availability of more data for fundamentals may not be sufficient to encourage 
investors to trade based on that data, as opposed to trading with the herd.   
 
These insights further help to explain the emergence of a speculative bubble in 
commodity derivative markets in 2007-11. Nevertheless, the question of how investment in 
this financial market impacts on underlying food prices remains unanswered. An explanation 
for this can be found in the altered role that derivative markets play in the global economy.  
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C. The Altered Role of Financial Markets 
 
As financial historians have related, futures exchanges in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries attempted to prevent their prices from being replicated in shadow futures 
exchanges known as ‘bucket shops’, where the ‘common people’ would speculate.140 The 
exchanges fought a legal battle between the 1880s and 1903 to try to prevent bucket shops 
from using their futures price quotations to facilitate wagers.141 Today, by contrast, 
commodity derivative markets are regarded as sophisticated information-gathering 
mechanisms that leads to ‘price discovery’. As Staritz and Küblböck summarize, ‘the price 
discovery function of trading on futures markets enables the open-market discovery of prices 
of commodities that are used as a benchmark for spot transactions and as a basis for 
decisions on production, consumption and investments’.142 That the prices on US futures 
exchanges are used to set prices in underlying commodity markets was confirmed by Charles 
Carey, the Chairman of the preeminent futures exchange, the CBOT, in 2007: ‘[T]he whole 
world sees our prices, and the whole world reacts to our prices’.143 There are applications for 
mobile phones that are marketed to farmers and grain commodity sellers to allow them to 
check futures prices for precisely this purpose.144 This prevalent market practice 
demonstrates that while investment in derivatives markets has no direct effect on commodity 
prices, it has a well-established indirect effect. Prices inflated by the ‘exuberance’ of 
financial investors in derivative markets can impact on underling commodity prices via the 
practice of benchmarking.145 Krugman, the economist whose comments are typically used to 
deny a role for speculation in the price volatility of 2007-11, would probably accept this. 
Nevertheless, he, along with other speculation sceptics, continues to place great faith in 
rational arbitrageurs to intervene and purchase physical commodities to restore prices to 
fundamental values. It is this process of arbitrage that is really the sticking point as concerns 
the economic debate over the significance of commodity derivatives in relation to the global 
food crisis. When the shift in the character of derivative markets is contemplated, and when 
the array of instruments that offer arbitrageurs the opportunity to profit from price volatility 
without paying for grain storage are taken into account, there is good reason to question the 
faith placed in these market actors to intervene and purchase physical grain. One might say 
that there is a realistic possibility that they too will be swept up in the ‘irrational exuberance’ 
of financial trading.146 One might also say that the fundamental changes in the composition 
of these markets have changed what it is rational for arbitrageur to do in them.        
 
As well as speaking to the debate over if commodity derivatives speculation was 
significant in the commodity price volatility of 2007-11, the new role of derivative markets 
in the global economy is also significant to investigations into how activity in commodity 
derivative markets can impact on underlying commodity prices. The word ‘activity’ must be 
stressed here, as the altered role of derivative markets suggests that it may also be 
commercial hedging that poses a threat to food prices. Speculation in commodity futures has 
been practiced for centuries. The critical difference with the contemporary trade in 
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commodity derivatives is that it enables a spectrum of different actors to take positions in the 
market for commodity futures that are not based on information about supply and demand 
fundamentals, but that are being read as such by other market actors. Once the prices listed 
on commodity futures exchanges were almost entirely a reflection of the needs of parties 
involved in agricultural production. Today, those prices are a function of a diverse range of 
motives, encompassing the desire to make profit through speculation, the need to diversify 
an investment portfolio, or the need to hedge against a risk taken in another market—be it 
commercial or financial. Rather than the problem lying solely or even predominantly with 
greedy, risk-loving financial speculators, hedging, if it is not carried out based on 
information about supply and demand fundamentals, may be just as problematic when it 
comes to food price volatility. This possibility has been widely overlooked in a regulatory 
approach fixated on preserving the benefits of commodity derivative markets for commercial 
actors, and on keeping international markets liberalized. 
 
 
D. Beyond Financial Regulation? 
 
The ambition to apply a scheme of regulatory rules that preserves the benefits of 
commodity derivative markets but removes their worst ‘excesses’ has an obvious appeal. As 
this article has illustrated, however, it may be the broader industry of commodity derivatives 
trading that puts food prices in jeopardy. It is not clear if this industry can be regulated in a 
way that removes the potential threat posed to food prices, whilst ensuring that derivatives 
can still be used to play a vital function in the management of various species of risk. 
Growing recognition of the limits of the post-crisis regulations has led to the advancement of 
some interesting proposals. Some have argued for an outright ban on commodity index funds 
on the basis that it is the nature of instruments that represents a threat to commodity prices, 
irrespective of the motives for which they are traded.147 Both Eric Posner and Glen Weyl and 
Saule Omarova have debated the possibility of introducing compulsory pre-market 
government licensing of complex financial instruments.148 These proposals seek to shift the 
burden of proof concerning the social utility and risks posed by a given financial instrument 
onto those seeking to profit by its trade. Much in the way that the US Federal Drugs Agency 
carries out safety checks on the use of medical drugs before they are released into the 
market, these proposals would require that instruments that have the potential to be ‘financial 
weapons of mass destruction’ are subject to higher standards of review and testing before 
being let loose in the economy.149 Other proposals, such as a financial transactions tax 
(FTT), would also appear to hold more potential then the existing reforms in terms of 
incentivizing investors to consider more productive, long-term investment options, as 
opposed to opting for short-term trading strategies.150 Perhaps such a tax could eventually 
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encourage more investors to invest directly actual agricultural production? A lack of 
investment in agriculture is, after all, one of the most commonly flagged reasons for the 
prevalence of hunger in the world today.151 Evaluating the likely efficacy of these more 
ambitious proposals for shielding commodity prices from future interference from derivative 
markets is beyond the scope of the article. However, it is suggested that these initiatives have 
greater potential than the existing US and EU measures for addressing the socially harmful 
effects of derivatives trading.  
 
More radical regulatory proposals are an option for policy-makers. Nevertheless, 
when the broader operations of the global economy are contemplated, there is also a case to 
be argued that other policies, aside from financial regulation, must be adopted if the food 
security and wellbeing of populations around the world is to be a priority. The current 
regulations leave the broader background conditions that give rise to a fertile environment 
for profitable speculative operations largely untouched. Prior to the abandonment of fixed 
exchange rates in the 1970s and the removal of restrictions on the free movement of capital, 
the need for commercial businesses to hedge financial risk was significantly lower. The need 
for hedging is, therefore, contingent on the (politically-determined) structure of the market. 
If, as this article has suggested, hedging practices may also put food prices in jeopardy, it 
might be necessary to use other measures that can help to stabilize food prices, instead of 
promoting further reliance on futures markets. One such option is the maintenance of buffer 
stocks that are released by governments into the market in order to stabilize episodes of price 
volatility. These measures have been rejected by leading international institutions, ostensibly 
on the basis that they are too costly.152 Considering the vital importance of food price 
stability around the world, however, surely it is those measures that are most effective in 
responding to the needs of human beings that ought to be prioritized, even if they are more 
expensive? As Olivier de Schutter has underlined, the establishment of international grain 
reserves could have been used to feed hungry people during the global food crisis.153 What is 
more, the depletion of national grain reserves in many countries in the Global South was 
pursued under a drive towards cost-effectiveness and market efficiency, and the 
prioritization of private mechanisms of risk management over public ones.154 Buffer stocks 
are a public mechanism of risk management; futures markets are a private one. Agricultural 
producers in developing countries continue to be encouraged to use futures contracts and 
derivative markets as tools of risk management, in spite of the risks that the trading of these 
instruments poses to food price stability. The analysis in this article would suggest, at the 
very least, the need for a serious reappraisal of the relative benefits of public and private risk 
management mechanisms. Ultimately, however, the form of the global food crisis of 2007-
11 suggests the need for a fundamental revision of global economic structures. Legal 
regimes fostering trade and financial liberalization, the merging of retail and investment 
banks, practices of subsidiarization that enable organizational arbitrage, and the existence of 
tax havens and off-shore financial centres remain far from the cross-hairs of financial 
regulators. MiFID II does not call into question many of the basic rules of MIFID I, which 
are designed to foster the further the integration, competitiveness and efficiency of EU 
financial markets. Many of these rules are explicitly aimed at creating an equal global 
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playing field for financial investors, and for facilitating the movement of all kinds of assets. 
They are also, then, an invitation to continue profitable speculative operations on fluctuating 
market values, and to develop yet more financial instruments to evade the current scheme of 
regulatory rules. Derivative instruments, after all, were an innovation developed as a means 
to circumvent regulations on the free movement of capital.155 What is more, as Dan Awrey 
and others have intimated, financial innovation poses a critical challenge to the future 
efficacy of even the most sophisticated body of regulatory rules.156  
 
The substantiated argument of this article is that the Dodd Frank and EMIR-MiFID II 
reforms are not suitable for the NGO project of addressing problematic trends in commodity 
derivatives trading. The author urges the NGO community and policy-makers to investigate 
further into the complex operations of derivative markets, and to ask deeper questions about 
how these instruments are impacting on values in and beyond underlying markets. However, 
a much more tentative conclusion that might be drawn from this study is that financial 
regulation alone may be insufficient to address developments in global finance that pose a 
threat to social welfare. Speculative investment and the bent of the financial services 
industry to develop complex products that enable investors to profit from volatility in 
underlying markets, irrespective of how this impact on human lives, would appear to be the 
very lifeblood of modern financial markets—their raison d’être. Is it possible to regulate 
these markets in a way that retains their profitability for financial investors and ensures 
stability for actors in the underlying economy? More radical proposals, such as the need for 
vulnerable populations to be delinked from international markets, and the need for a 
reconsideration of trade and capital liberalization rules can be easily dismissed as unfeasible. 
Yet, as this article has shown, neither does financial regulation appear to a viable strategy if 
the needs of people are to be put before the pursuit of financial profit. More radical proposals 
that might lead to more effective and sustainable solutions deserve contemplation.  
 
 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
 
Scholars and organizations concerned with the persistence of hunger in the world 
have been warning of the dangers of exposing small farmers and poor communities in the 
Global South to liberalized markets for years. The events of the global food crisis of 2007-11 
confirmed the validity of their concerns regarding the precarious state of the global food 
system. Millions of people worldwide were left unable to command access to basic food 
staples during this period, as a result of the spread of rampant commodity price volatility 
from international markets. A substantial body of evidence attributes some measure of the 
volatility to the activities of financial and corporate actors transacting in commodity 
derivative markets. Yet, in spite of the potential threat that commodity derivatives pose for 
global food security, these instruments continue to be positioned by international institutions 
to play a leading role in agricultural risk management going forward. The drive to keep 
flows of trade and capital liberalized—coupled with the ambition to preserve the risk 
management function that derivatives play in the broader economy—has resulted a 
regulatory agenda bent on retaining the benefits of derivative markets, and on fixing their 
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worst defects. Significant attention and resources are now being directed towards 
effectuating a regulatory strategy that is content to leave many of the structural 
underpinnings that have led to food prices becoming vulnerable to the logics of financial 
markets untouched.  
 
Legal scholars analyzing the new regulatory architectures in the US and the EU have 
tended to focus on their capacity to respond to concerns about systemic risk and financial 
market competitiveness. This article has sought to focus attention on the equally important 
question of the utility of the regulations for shielding food prices from future ‘speculative’ 
interference. By means of a critical analysis of the regulatory measures, the article has 
demonstrated that the faith placed in the Dodd Frank and EMIR-MiFID II reforms by parties 
concerned to prevent a repeat of the events of 2007-11 is misplaced. Both the US and EU 
regulations are largely confined to a project of attempting to reinstate limits that used to 
function to restrict volumes of speculative investment on futures exchanges in the past. This 
is a serious underestimation of the significant changes in the nature of speculative trading 
that have occurred in the interim. The new reforms are predicated on a conceptual distinction 
between types of market participant that is insufficiently sensitive to the mixed motives for 
which both financial and corporate actors enter into positions on futures markets. What is 
more, the new regulations not only critically underweight the role that collective market 
psychology—enabled and augmented by new instruments and trading technologies— plays 
in determining futures prices, but they fail to adequately account for how the price 
‘discovery’ function of financial markets leads inflated futures prices to impact on the prices 
of physical food commodities.   
 
As well as illustrating the limitations of the new regulatory proposals, the article has 
also challenged a number of pervasive assumptions about the dynamics of commodity 
derivative markets that have been used to negate the very possibility that speculative 
practices contributed global food crisis. In particular, objections have been raised to the faith 
placed in rational arbitrageurs by skeptical economists—a faith that appears illogical when 
read alongside the other characteristics commonly attributed to ‘economic man’, such as the 
drive to maximize one’s own utility. Equally, though, the article suggests that the 
characterizations common throughout much of the NGO literature need to be revisited. 
Commercial hedging is largely given the thumbs up by those concerned to respond to the 
perceived excesses of the financial sector; and yet, to the extent that more complex hedging 
needs may mean that commercial hedging is not being carried out based on research into 
agricultural supply and demand fundamentals, this pervasive market practice may also put 
food prices in jeopardy. Taken together, the work carried out in this article lends support to 
the arguments of those who support the development of more radical regulatory measures 
intended to address harmful trends in the financialization of economic and social life. It 
further points to the need for deeper structural issues in the global economy to be 
acknowledged and addressed, if the most basic needs of vulnerable populations are not to be 
prejudiced by the needs of financial capital in the years to come.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
